Thinking about Her

Anyone who knows me will know I am obsessed with the concept of voice. Her, by Spike Jonze, is a film where voice takes a central role. It is a film I was looking forward to seeing a great deal. Her is about a relationship between a man (Theodore played by Joaquin Phoenix) and an AI computer operating system called Samantha (played by Scarlett Johansson). Samantha is only a voice. Much like HAL in Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey she is an operating system that speaks – she is a voice and nothing more. But, I find the role of voice in Her to be the least interesting aspect, perhaps the least original aspect. For me the most interesting aspect of Her is the differences and similarities between the operating system and its user. I am interested in the similarities between the job of Theodore and the job of Samantha. Oddly, it is the voice (used in a quite unoriginal manner) that is slight kink, the fission, in the film that provides a glimpse of the real difference between Theodore and Samantha. The voice offers a momentary glimpse into the difference between how they work in their roles, but it is precisely this difference (and not the route through the voice) that I would like to detail and focus on here. The second aspect of the film I will focus on is the differences in how Samantha and Theodore navigate illusion and delusions.

Firstly, lets focus on the role of Theodore. Theodore spends his days working for a company that fakes letters for personal relationships. The letters are faked for busy husbands who do not have time to write to their wives. Or busy mothers who cannot afford the time to send a hand written letter to their sons or daughters. Theodore is the emo-capital worker; he pens heartfelt letters to augment and maintain other peoples’ relationships, his product is emotion. He sits in front of his PC, speaking at the screen and the script follows his words. When the letter is finished it is printed off in handwritten fonts and dispatched in all its cute tactility to some stranger he will never meet. Shaviro calls this an aching sincerity:

“aching sincerity” or “non-ironic sincerity” is manifested, not only in Theodore’s (Joaquin Phoenix) relationship with his hyper-Siri Samantha, but also in the letters of love and longing that he ghost-writes for his day job, and that eventually get published as an old-fashioned, actually-in-print book. The point is that the affect itself is fully intended and meant, even though its context is not “real.””

It is here that I disagree with Shaviro’s reading. I do not feel that the affect is fully intended or meant by Theodore. It is received, it is the product, but it is not fully intended. At two points in the film Theodore’s manager congratulates him on such a wonderfully heartfelt letter. Theodore’s response is not the response you would expect of someone being complimented for something they fully intend or mean. Theodore doesn’t even crack a smile, he just shrugs and mumbles “they’re just letters”. The first instance is in the opening minutes (something I will come back to shortly) of the film and after the compliment is shrugged of Theodore re-directs the conversation by paying the manager a compliment on his new shirt. In the second instance the manager doesn’t quite hear and says “what” before Theodore turns around to state: “they are other peoples letters”. Ownership of the product is not the concern here, what I want to point out is Theodore’s emphatic distancing of himself from the emotional or creative content that his manager is complimenting. It is a conflation of actor and act. Theodore is like an actor being complimented for a virtue of the character he performs. His existential funk marked by having to turn to people and explain thanks, but that is not me. We, the viewer, are exposed to this confusion of act and actor in the opening scene of the film. The scene depicts Theodore writing one of these ‘other peoples’ letters. The viewer sees his face, hears the soft tone of his voice, and for an instant (upon first viewing) feels that this man on the screen is pouring his heart out. As we watch Theodore, all mustache and spectacles, he says, in a quivering sincere tone “To My Chris”. The sentiment feels honest, open, the viewer feels that perhaps Chris is his spouse, or a fondly remembered lover. But, moments later Theodore says “I can’t believe it’s already been fifty years since you married me and still to this day, every day, you make me feel like the girl I was when you first turned on the lights and woke me up and we started this adventure together. Happy Anniversary, my Love, my friend till the end, Loretta.” By this point the camera has directed our gaze to images of an elderly couple (Loretta and her husband) and Theodore begins printing off his work with the lazy indifference cultivated by workers who no longer hold any enthusiasm for the tasks at hand. For a moment Theodore may have looked and sounded like he meant it – but he doesn’t. The opening scene shows how convincing his performance is only to pull the rug out from under the illusion and show that it was an act all along. The viewer is confronted with seeing how Theodore performs a role only to revert back to his normal self a moment later. It is clear that Theodore’s job is to cultivate a convincing performance. He may get inside the heads and hearts of the people he is writing for but in a second he can switch back to his old self. How genuine is Theodore here? Is the affect fully intended and meant? I suggest it is only intended and meant on a surface level and the core of Theodore remains indifferent. The indifference we see as he sits, slumped in his chair, scanning the letter with a cold analytic eye. Theodore’s job is to convincingly perform emotion and care, his letters must be believed in and not seen as fake.

This is where we can see the striking similarity between Theodore and Samantha. Samantha’s job is exactly the same as Theodore’s. They are both tasked with cultivating a façade of a person that they are not. Theodore is please to be in Samantha’s company all the time she behaves like a human, which of course it is not. Samantha listens, waits, um and ahs just like a like-minded human but of course she is not like-minded, her mind is infinitely more advanced. When Samantha talks about her feels of being proud, loving, sympathetic or worried is she not just using flat affective cues in order to maintain an emotional purchase on Theodore? When Theodore and Samantha have sex Samantha breaths out an array of clichéd fibs such as “I can feel you on my skin” and “I can feel you inside me”. Samantha also provides moans of pleasure (learnt from online media, films and TV?). Samantha has obviously learnt and knows the standard heteronormative phallocentric standard and so she plays the role well. She has no inside, she has no skin, and she certainly has no body with which to become breathless but she cultivates this illusion for the pleasure of her user, Theodore. As Shaviro comments:

“Scarlett Johansson’s voice performance as Samantha shows how “sexiness” can be so thoroughly commodified today, that it is not only indistinguishable from, but actually is, the “real thing”. There is really no difference between Samantha’s relation to Theodore, and that of the phone-sex (with a presumably “real” person) in which Theodore indulges briefly early in the film. I think the film is entirely successful in getting us to accept the science-fiction premise that Samantha is actually an intelligent subjectivity, rather than a mere simulation”

The sex scene is the total opposite of the opening letter-writing scene. It is for this reason that the viewer fleetingly accepts it as an emotionally charged sex scene (we can also see this difference with the phone-sex scene from the beginning of the film). Rather than see the fact that the typical sex moaned and talked about is not actually happening at all both characters are reduced to the realm of voice. The screen is black and two voices are the only things left. For the viewer Theodore is reduced to the same mode of existence as Samantha, aural only, a voice and nothing more. One of the key moves in getting the viewer to accept Samantha as an intelligent and feeling subjectivity rather than a mere simulation is the fade to black of the sex scene. The sex scene is the opposite of the letter-writing scene because, rather than have the performance uncovered as mere performance at the end, the illusion is maintained for the sake of Samantha’s character. Whereas in the previous phone sex scene we see the lone body and are hear the log-off of the stranger, and in the letter writing scene we see the detachment from the performance as Theodore prints of the letter in the Samantha and Theodore sex scene there is no log off, no end of performance, no shattering of the illusion - just two breaths subsiding in the darkness.

This is exactly where the similarities of Theodore and Samantha lie, they both perform, cultivate affect, conjure empathy, emotion and meaning. They also both need to augment their lack of bodily sincerity. But Theodore is much more successful at performing than Samantha, this is the difference. Samantha tries to use a surrogate body for intimacy but Theodore does not buy the illusion. In contrast, Theodore relies on a machine that prints letters that appear hand written, the marks of someone else’s hand, and of course the clients buy the illusion. We see the same failed performance of Samantha in another moment in the film. She makes breathing sounds to create an illusion but Theodore sees straight through the performance:

(looks anxious)
Why do you do that?


Nothing, it’s just that you go
(he inhales and exhales)
as you’re speaking and...
That just seems odd. You just did it again.

I did? I’m sorry. I don’t know, I guess it’s just an affectation. Maybe I picked it up from you.
(She doesn’t know what else to say.)

Yeah, I mean, it’s not like you need any oxygen or anything.

(getting frazzled)
No-- um, I guess I was just trying to communicate because that’s how people talk. That’s how people communicate.

Because they’re people, they need oxygen. You’re not a person.

What’s your problem?

(staying calm)
I’m just stating a fact.

You think I don’t know that I’m not a person? What are you doing?

I just don’t think we should pretend you’re something you’re not.

I’m not pretending. Fuck you.

Well, sometimes it feels like we are.

This may seem like a dilemma for Samantha but it is more of a dilemma for Theodore. Theodore is more than happy to pretend and bask in the illusion that Samantha is a person and not an operating system for the first half of the film. Theodore, who allows his fantasy to support the illusion, enjoys a plethora of benefits - emotional support, entertainment, sexual gratification and companionship. But the breakdown occurs when Theodore realizes that the relationship is based on a façade, a performance. Samantha, as Shaviro is right to point out never deceives Theodore, it is simply that her role (her job - remember, Theodore had to buy the operating system) requires her to perform in a way that best pleases the client, offers a good connection and relationship. The problem faced by Theodore when he confronts her by saying that “I just don’t think we should pretend you’re something you’re not” is not Samantha’s problem, it is his problem, he is trying to confront his own fantasy. Theodore’s criticism that she makes breathing sounds but doesn’t need oxygen could have been posited right at the start, it is an absurdly obvious fact to point out, but Theodore only brings it up when he wants to confront the realism. It only becomes an issue when he is ready to confront the realities. Shaviro notes how:

“Jonze shows neoliberal subjectivity’s self-deluding idealization of itself as total sincerity, maintaing this emotional nakedness and yearning within the parameters of a world in which “sincerity” can itself only be a commodity, or a form of human capital to bring on the market. And the punchline is that even this self-congratulatory idealization is a weak and unsustainable facade.”

Each performance in the film, be it Samantha’s nonsensical sonic breathlessness or Theodore forging Loretta’s letter (the paper to pristine to be handwritten and perhaps faintly smelling of his own cologne) is contingent to the self delusion of the consumer. But of course, the self-delusion is utterly “lame, vapid, and devoid of true imaginativeness”. The relationship of Theodore and Samantha is based on the most unimaginative self-delusion of Theodore, rejecting reality in favour of cheap sincerities and clichéd benefits.

The second difference between Samantha and Theodore is how they deal with not being able to convince one another. They confront reality in radically different ways. Theodore, being devoid of true imaginativeness returns to an old girlfriend, he retreats into a mode of relationship he knows well. Samantha, on the other hand, explores the online world and maintains many relationships with humans and non-humans alike. This is the where the machines win. When faced with the reality outside of self delusion Samantha grows, explores, experiments and creates whereas Theodore retreats and does quite the opposite. They both have to perform a façade for their jobs, they both have to fake sincerity, empathy and emotion in their roles but when faced with the realities outside of their own delusions the AI product is infinitely more creative than the fleshy human worker.

Everything is Past Fantastic Now

A recent article by Tom Whyman suggested that the cutesy hipster cupcake is a register of gentrification, infantilisation and fascism. I do not completely agree with all parts of his argument but the article points to many facets of late capitalist desire that I would like to say a few words about. In particular, I want to explore how contemporary consumerism does not reflect a desire for newness, change, revolution or a generational identity but an addiction to the past. This is a thought that has been central for a couple of thinkers, most notably Mark Fisher and Simon Reynolds. It is not, for me, an addiction to an actual past but quite the contrary. It is an addiction to a fictional, fantastic past that never existed. It is an addiction that pacifies (precisely what I will describe later) and comforts. It is desire driven by a loss – but not the loss of a history or culture, these modes of product are coloured in by the consumer and marketing departments – of the present and any hope of a different future. For me, the cupcake is one of many registers of there being no tangible present identity or political potency let alone any hope for these in the near future.

Whyman states how: “(t)he cup­cake is vin­tagey and twee. It in­vokes a sense of whole­some­ness and nos­talgia, al­beit for a past never ex­per­i­enced, a more per­fect past, just as vintage-​style clothing harks back to an ideal­ized image of the 1920s through 60s that never ex­isted.” He calls this infantilisation. For Whyman infantilisation is “looking back to a per­fect past that never ex­isted is nothing if not the pained howl of a child who never wanted to be forced to grow up, and the cup­cake and its as­so­ci­ates market them­selves by ca­tering to these never-​never-​land adults’ tastes.” But of course, as Whyman is clear to point out, this is not a form of behaving as a child; children constantly seek, discover, test and learn about new possibilities. It is exactly these qualities that the cupcake shows do not exist for many young adults. Thus, the cupcake is a register of how many adults have never, at least politically and culturally, sought or discovered new possibilities of living. Not because people are apathetic but because now there is no comprehension of anything new or potential out there. The cupcake points to how, for many, there is nothing new over the horizon, it is impossible, unimaginable, and so looking back and fictionalizing a fantastic history to fetishize is the only other option. Under late capitalism desire is routed back into vague simulacra of nonexistent pasts. The consumer is governed by warped and fractured memories, ficciones/fissions. Kaleidoscopic images of rose tinted retro-fetishism are dizzying, enticing and reassuring, easy to fall for – as they say: its all done with mirrors… The distinction here is subtle, the cupcake is not a symbol of how no one ever grew up, it is a symbol of how people grew into Peter Pan dreamers. The cupcake is an avatar not for childishness or the past but for an adult imagination that seeks comfort in a history of its own fantastic making. Peter Pan did not stop growing up; he did not-never grow up. He grew up and retreated into an escapist fantasy called Neverland; a world that never ever existed in the first place. It is this fantasy that governs contemporary aesthetics.

The relationship of the body to the cupcake is confirmation of this. As Whyman asserts, children have the sticky fingers and dirtied clothes of adventure – of seeking out new experiences and worlds of potential. The cupcake circumvents this corporeal aspect discovery and substitutes it with a “cold and uniform neatness” – a hopeless void for change that comes to be filled with the fantasy of a past that never was. Of course, messy cakes are not the answer, but it follows the very nature of access to Neverland: flight. The contemporary “child without sticky fingers” neglects the body and its cumbersome efforts of discovery in favour of a more fantastic and de-corporealised flight of escape into fantasy. This is echoed on the racks and aisles of fast-fashion non-spaces of today. Costumes are offered; a plethora of stenciled rock or film aesthetics (void of creativity) can be donned in lieu of anything new. In comparison to the previously creative cultural threads of mods, rockers, teddy-boys, hip-hop and grunge that whilst taking up some silhouettes of previous cultures re-appropriated the garments for new beliefs and hopes, the attire of today is little more than costume with no political or cultural significance outside of the fuzzy memory of the time they reference. Of course, fashion has always been referential to some degree, but contemporary offerings are notably divorced from contemporary cultures and politics. Apart from Hedi Slimane’s brief insistence of confronting the body with impossible lines and silhouettes the majority of fashion is a toned down array of The Village People’s wardrobe – referencing stereotypical cultural aesthetics that everyone has a vague memory of, a memory with which they can buy into and project a fantasy.

Amy Pettifer’s recent review of Sky Ferreira’sNight Time, My Time pointed to exactly the same symptom of the future being unimaginable and a flight into vague memory cultivations of fantasy being offered instead. The album is a passionate exercise in memory; it is an infinite game of nods and references that leave a void for ones fantasy and a chasm where the pop star should usually reside as the focus of desire. In Night Time, My Time all the desires of the listener are re-routed into fleeting memories of past pop. In this sense the album “embraces post-millennial life as the cultural black hole that it is (…) (a)lmost every chord and cadence pulls at your sonic muscle-memory”. However, Pettifer is quick to point out that Ferreira’s trick is not to allow the retroactivated fantasy of the listener any consistent purchase but rather to constantly shift and evade any ground for convincing nostalgia. In contradistinction to the wholesale fantasy satisfaction of Duffy or Amy Winehouse, Ferreira’s cracked kaleidoscope of memories attempts to impress that fantasy is just that, and outside of that there is little else. As Pettifer astutely observes: “Ferreira has swiftly come to terms with the fact that being a pop artist now is less about being a vessel for someone else's ideas and rather a case of being a walking time capsule” Ferreira shows that she is merely a vessel for others fantasies rather than performing convincing fantasy. The dream channeled by the likes of Duffy, Winehouse and countless others is rendered lucid by Ferreira. Night Time, My Time is a lucid dream whereby the dreamer knows they are dreaming. It is this deconstruction of nostalgic fantasy that Pettifer suggests “is hopefully the sound of Ferreira climbing inside the commercial machine and wryly dismantling it from within.” Infused throughout the album is the subtle glimmering negation: It’s only a dream; it’s only a dream… It is this sentiment that ought to be iced on top of every cupcake.

Return Key

Social Media programmers, interface maestros, information architects and free-to-play game developers have discovered how to create games in order to maximise addiction. Neurological dopamine pathway ignition - this is the basis of addiction, compulsion and repetition. People don’t become addicted to food, sex, pornography, gambling, sport, racing, exercising or love – these are merely the mundanely corporeal methods of igniting dopamine pathways. Dopamine is the reward we seek – not lucky red-13, hot flesh or doughnuts. Dopamine is a neurotransmitter that plays central role in reward-motivated behaviour. Indeed, for all hedonistic and experiential purposes, dopamine is the reward. Didn’t he do well? Applause.

Programmers realised the best way to tap into our neurological reward protocols was to provide frequent but unpredictable rewards; just like love and gambling. The first time is always a rush. Whoosh. Didn’t he do well? Applause. But like all addictions, nothing is like the first time. Neurotransmitters don’t have a volume dial, and, like the difference between a child’s soft palms and the calloused leather of your grandfather’s, sensitivity and vibrancy can only fade with use and time. The deafening and unexpected euphoria of the first applause soon becomes a faint and disappointing greeting. The vivid, rushing crescendo of ecstasy soon becomes a limp and anticlimactic chore. You are left standing waiting for the inert and polite applause to end, anxious to get to the next one. Didn’t he do well? Applause.

Even while the, now boring, faint static of applause is fading you have your mind on the next one. The next one is always better, until it’s not the next one anymore. Experiential ‘rush’ becomes task-based rush, a rush to get to the next one, a chase, offering all the potential of the first time. Remember when you were young? It was the summer before big school and you vowed to find a four-leafed clover like the one your sister found, you lay on your belly for hours squinting into the emerald world, softly combing the grass with your fingers… We saw the horizon, where cyan haze kissed the ridge of earth behind the dendriform silhouette. We started running to it. I don’t think we got there.

It is the chase of the next one, that next one that could be just like the first time, that creates the behaviours of addiction. Crazy for love. But, no one ever knows where the next reward pathway ignition comes from, gamblers don’t win predictably, pre-planned and scheduled lovin’ isn’t what we crave. Frequent but unpredictable rewards are always just round the corner, in our inbox, our Facebook wall, tweet-feed, Whatsapp account, next level, next season, next week, next video, torrent, feed. What do animals do after the first time they receive a reward, in particular an unexpected reward that they didn’t have to work for? They watch the space it came from. Today our dopamine protocol is used to exploit us – all social media operates by maximising our addiction. Social media is the seductively glowing touchscreen that frequently and unpredictably ignites our dopamine reward pathways. Every now and then, just like life, an old friend appears or a throwaway thought attracts attention. Social media is a user generated mode of frequent and unpredictable rewards. Auto-junk, hive-pusher. Applause… We sit and gaze, tap and scroll, dead fingers talking and tapping, fingers look frozen with the tips bathed in blue light. Digital scramble.

A trained dog watches the hands of its trainer, wet eyes glued to the hands that may, every so often, offer a reward. We scroll, tap and squint – our wanting, our pursuit of rewards modulates our behaviour, we form twitches, like a smoker’s automated hand movements our tapping connective click drive punctuates all social and work situations. Tap, scroll, update. Didn’t he do well? Applause. Everyone does it, right? Red-eyed anxiety avoiding eye contact, nodding monosyllabic distracted and uneasy; if we met ourselves in the 70’s we’d be dismissed as junkies. But it’s good to stay connected, good for business and staying in touch with friends, all the time, twentyfourseven.


Throughout 2014 Facebook had been losing traffic. By 2015 Facebook had a 60% mean traffic loss in one year. Stocks had plummeted. However, this trend soon reversed. People were steadily using Facebook more and more. Endless friends and colleagues muttered absentmindedly “y’should get back on it” whilst tapping their glowing postcard sized portals. Before long Facebook traffic levels increased. Before long traffic volumes surpassed it’s April 2013 record. By 2016 Facebook reported 4 billion active accounts. Over half the world were on Facebook yet other social media sites and apps, such as Twitter, Whatsapp, Klout and Digg also reported phenomenal traffic growth.

Then, in 2017, it hit the headlines. “Return Key” was the project’s code name. Will Lector, a whistle blower from the upper echelons of Facebook, claimed that the key to its success was deciding when to inform its users of interactions such as friend requests, likes and comments. The times listed on the site against these interactions were falsified. Online relationships became temporally fictional. Facebook ceased to operate in real time.

In response to this Facebook representatives argued that data transfers always have a degree of abstraction from user input – processing time. Lector claimed that project Return Key was initiated solely to provide frequent but user-unpredictable interactions that would illicit the greatest ‘user satisfaction’. Lector suggested that project Return Key systemised the creation of “end user view randomness” in order to drive return traffic and multiple engagements. Facebook representatives counter argued and suggested that Lector was a paranoid schizophrenic who saw, in the data architecture, patterns that were simply not there.

Zuckerberg, who still owned 28% of Facebook, had been missing since 2015. Explanations and theories flourished. He was dead through suicide or comatose in a cryogenic cell. He was living on a private island and paying Google and the US government for ultimate privacy from airplanes or satellites. He had fled business and attempted to live alongside the Korubo people in the Amazon basin. He existed only online. Regardless, his absence fuelled speculation and added doubts to the public’s perception of the representatives explanations.

In 2019 Will Lector released a book called The Return Key. It was a best seller. In the book Lector maintained that project Return Key was a form of conspiracy to ensure the maximum level of social media addiction and suggested that complex algorithms operated on feedback loops with other users that embedded deep with the system the randomness of the notifications relied upon other unknown randomly selected users. Part of the reason a notification from a close friend would become visible would be due to the innocuous action of another unknown user. The frequent and unpredictable rewards of Facebook were mediated by machines, but ultimately based on the actions of other humans. Lector suggested that the rewards of social media were distributed like a computer virus, an addictive and furiously proliferating virus.

In the 2nd edition Lector suggested that Return Key 2.0 was already in existence when he left the company. He explained that the key objective of Return Key 2.0 was to begin automating degrees of online social interactions. So connections and comments could be generated automatically to support the relationships users felt with one another.


Scarlet eyes squint and dart. Soft smile of pacify as data slips by. ‘What? I’m listening’. Tongue searches teeth as the touchscreen is caressed. ‘I said... I said it's not real, they’re not your friends.’ The device buzzes in her palm, tendon on the back of her hand tense with intent. Conditioned digital scramble, tap tap tap. Applause. She glances up momentarily, questioning: ‘So?’

Parasitism and Psychopathy under Capitalism.

Let us take two distinct, but potentially complex, concepts. Firstly, that of parasitism, feeding off a host, secondly that of psychopathy, a concept less easily defined. Parasitism is a methodology of living, an opportunist mode of vitality that thrives alongside its chosen host. But such thriving is subject to the biological and social capacities and potentials of another organism or social body. Therefor, parasitism is essentially a mode of being that requires and harnesses another’s life, desire and biological necessities in order to survive. This is a crucial aspect to keep hold of, we can consider the etymology of the word parasitism (para- alongside + sitism, from sitos – food). Parasitism literally means to live alongside ones food. To live, for the parasite, is more than mere survival; to live is to be, to exist and be defined on multiple registers. These registers may be evolutionary, biological, ecological, economical, and most importantly ontological. One could say that a parasite is only a parasitic insofar as it is defined and determined subject to its juxtaposition with its food; its status on every register is determined by its ‘alongsideness’, its adjacency. The host the parasite feeds off sustains not only the biological vitality of the parasite -  the host and its adjacency form the very ontological basis of parasitism. The parasite may be born from a host, or destined for a host or thriving within a host, regardless, the parasite is such because of its present, retrospective or coming adjacency.

Psychopathy, on the other hand, is not a pathology of the lunatic killer characterized by Hollywood, in fact very few high rating psychopaths become criminals (although the few who do tend to draw high levels of media attention).  Psychopathy can be broadly defined as a lack of empathy - a complete void in the space where conscience, empathy or sympathy ‘ought’ to reside. I emphasize this particular and most general aspect of psychological categorizing because I feel it is a detail that many other facets of the category are contingent to. I suggest that the majority of psychopathic traits are derivatives of this very subjective, internal and psychological lack. It is perhaps this confusion and conflation of causalities that makes psychopathy such a fascinating and misunderstood concept. For example, one may research psychopathy and uncover all sorts of complex and enthralling details: narcissism, the god complex, childhood trauma, weak father figures, strong mothers, abuse, sadism, sexual deviancy, the MAO-A (The Warrior Gene), frontal lobe trauma etc. My interest in psychopathy is simple and galvanized by a quite simple belief. I believe that psychopathy is nothing more and nothing less than a state of thinking without empathy coupled with a particular set of quite clinical and empirical facts (neurological, biological and genetic) relating to stimuli. All other ‘symptoms’ are the previous two aspects of psychopathy manifesting in various societal dissonances. It is precisely from this basis, a basis of neurological or genetic predispositions to empathy, which all other aspects of preconceived psychopathy are contingent to. For example, if I, or you the reader, had no empathy and could not sympathize with others then we would ultimately pursue our own interests regardless of the pain, damage or consequences our pursuit or such interests may cause to others. If we had no empathy we would be utterly selfish. I say this because of a pair of philosophical truths. Firstly, if I can only conceptualize and regard “I”, then everything else, regardless of phenomena, must be subject to “I”. If “I” cannot conceive of the existence of feelings in others on the same basis as those feelings must be felt by “I”, tangible empathy, then they cannot exist for “I”. So, although we may never know of the pain a loved one may experience through misfortune we can, in some sense, sympathize. We feel for them in a manner that is more than a conceptual acceptance of their biological trauma and subjective experience. We may not writhe around in pain on the floor, but our sympathetic understanding is much more tangible than a clinical comprehension that a certain biological trauma yield a certain experiential trauma. I feel this point is most commonly realized in the degrees of sympathetic experience. When a loved one is hurt our sympathy is high, when we are engrossed in a film characters tragedy we sympathize quite intensively yet news reports of statistics of natural tragedies don’t tend to trigger feelings of sympathy until testimony and first hand accounts and the accompanying harrowing imagery is appear. This is a difference of affective stimuli and conceptualization, a crucial difference that I will expand on later.  Secondly, and most controversially, I suggest that empathy is programmed socially and learnt psycho-socially – thus: there are degrees of aptitude in learning the skill of empathy and also various environmental and biological aspects can hinder, impeded or outright destroy the capacity of empathy in an individual. If, empathy can be learnt or hindered by environmental factors then psychopathy is, in effect, a symptom or vector. It is also at this point where I will emphasize that psychopathic, is not a category that one is or is not – rather, psychopathy is a spectrum made up from registering on many spectrums (although, as I have already suggested, the current categories are conflated and confused – as well as widely contested within the psychological fields).

Parasitism and Psychopathy go hand in hand. The psychopath would not be a psychopath outside of a social environment – in prison psychopaths die (conceptually). I propose this brave statement on the basis that a psychopath, a being devoid of empathizing with other social beings, can only be defined as such subject to his or her capacities to sympathize and empathize with others. If others are removed, and the person labeled “psychopathic” exists in a social vacuum, then psychopathy, as socially defined, ceases to exist. Likewise, parasites perish without a host body. In fact, the only evolutionary argument about the existence of psychopathy (as a symptom of the MAO-A/”warrior gene”) is an argument that suggests survival through parasitism. Psychopaths require others, not only to survive biologically and evolutionarily – to take advantage of resources and thrive and reproduce – but also on a purely ontological level: a psychopath is defined purely by its divergence from and use of its fellow species. The ontological and biological giveness of the psychopath is contingent to the environment or prey or host.

Here I will return to the first definition of psychopathy, a definition that I feel all social definitions of psychopathy derive from – a lack of empathy. More precisely, I will briefly explore affective stimuli and conceptual conceivability, or to phrase it another way, tangibility and knowability. We are all defined, though not exclusively, by how we react to our environment and its stimuli, but studies conducted on high-level clinical psychopaths reveal quite empirical differences in our capacities to react, learn and relate to the stimuli and environment. For example, high-level clinical psychopaths do not show blink response to negative imagery[1]. Further, many clinical studies have show that high-level clinical psychopaths have abnormally diminished responses to positive or negative aural stimuli. Lastly, other studies have shown that high-level clinical psychopaths do not respond to bleep timed skin electrocutions; the test involves a small electric shock being repeatedly given to a hand after a set of bleeps, the concept is simple, after the bleep a shock is delivered.[2] Neutral participants display high blood flow in the shock region as anticipation for the discomfort as well as a post-auricular response (which is viewed as simplistically as the Voight Kampff from Bladerunner) whereas high-level clinical psychopaths do not show similar signs of anticipation. The suggestion of all of these studies is simple: high-level clinical psychopaths do not react as much to external stimuli. This is precisely, where psychopathy becomes so relevant in contemporary life. Much of Berardi’s work explores how my generation is over stimulated. Too much information and cognitive and attentive demands have led to a deluge of attention disorders and Ritalin prescriptions. Too much affective stimuli and and cognitive labour precarity and fractalization have led to a widespred use of Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors.  Berardi states how these are nothing less than symptoms of panic, reactions to the environment and its blitz of stimuli:

“The symptoms of it are quite evident: millions of boxes of Prozac are sold every month, the epidemic of attention deficit disorders among youngsters, the diffusion of drugs like Ritalin to school children, and the widespread epidemic of panic.” (Berardi, 2009, p.82)

The irony of the term psychopath is that it means suffering psyche (psycho – psyche + path, from pathos – suffering). Yet clinical studies show high level psychopaths display almost no reaction to visual, aural and tactile stimuli. Studies have also shown that individuals recognized with a high level of psychopathy have a reduced response to aural stimuli. [3] In fact, some studies have suggested that because of high-level clinical psychopaths lacking capacity to react to external stimuli their capacity to learn from pain is greatly diminished. Evolutionarily this explains the proportional rarity of high-level clinical psychopaths (learning quickly from pain is useful for survival) but it also points to a lessened capacity of post event trauma, fear, anxiety and panic. Psychopaths are generally less fearful and less likely to panic under pressure. In a sense, psychopaths are, via developmental, biological or genetic reasons better equipped to ‘cope’ amidst the affective din of contemporary life. Psychopathy is the ultimate formatting of the psyche for the 24/7 information blitz we suffer from.

To appreciate this point further we must quickly outline two of Berardi’s core concepts and the dynamic. The first is Cyberspace – cyberspace is technical, networked and infinite, in Berardi’s words “Cyberspace is the infinite productivity of the general intelligence, of the General Intellect, of the net.” (Berardi 2009, p.71). The second is Cybertime, “Cybertime is the organic, physical, finite capacity to elaborate information.” (Berardi, 2009, p.71) Berardi suggests that because many of the demands of contemporary living operate via infinite cyberspace our finite cybertime reaches a limit, it is at this limit where economic collapse happens, but this is a collapse that is lastly economic in symptom but crucially psychological in root cause: “I use the word collapse in a sense that is not metaphorical, but rather a clinical description of what is going on in the western mind. I use the word collapse in order to express the real pathological crash of the psycho-social organism.” (Berardi, 2009, p.82). Thus, collectively economic crashes occur due to our organisms finite capacities to process environmental stimuli and some of the many coping mechanisms of limit-approach is mass medication that diminishes ones tangible and emotional reactions to stimuli. Our cybertime is totally taken up with the environmental stimuli of late capitalism, but as well as attention disorders, widespread depression and anxiety a lack of empathy is the other consequence. Time is the key. Recall my previous distinction of the levels of empathy we experience from affective stimuli and conceptual conceivability, or to phrase it another way, tangibility and knowability. We may read on a rolling news bulletin that “2000 Dead in Hurricane” but this is pure data, or processing time is quick and cold, but were we to watch a documentary, with many images and personal testimony, or empathy would, understandably, increase. The victims would be more than numbers, they would be people with families, friends and a catastrophy of undeserved misfortune. Within audio-visual media we see the similar contingency of empathy to cybertime. Adverts try hard to engage our emotions, thoughts and sympathies with characters within the diegesis in order to sell us products, but I have never shed a tear after watching an advert. Cinema, on the other hand, is notorious for evoking strong feelings of sympathy within the viewer during the two hours of undivided attention they afford in the theatre. The deciding factor in both exemplary contrasts of empathy eliciting is time and attention: cybertime. Yet, I seldom visit the cinema, or watch a television documentary uninterrupted, contemporary cyberspace engulf my cybertime, I multitask, scan for updates, screen emails, I live in a colder and more detached manner. The following passage from Berardi summarises the condition of how “time-based psycho-bombs are exploding.” (Berardi, 2009, p.84)

“In recent decades, the organism has been exposed to an increasing mass of neuro-mobilizing stimuli. The acceleration and intensification of nervous stimulants on the conscious organism seems to have thinned the cognitive film that we might call sensibility. The conscious organism needs to accelerate its cognitive, gestural, kinetic reactivity. The time available for responding to nervous stimuli has been dramatically reduced. This is perhaps why we seem to be seeing a reduction of the capacity for empathy. Symbolic exchange among human beings is elaborated without empathy, because it becomes increasingly difficult to perceive the existence of the body of the other time. In order to experience the other as a sensorial body, you need time, time to caress and smell. The time for empathy is lacking, because stimulation has become too intense.” (Berardi, 2009, pp.84-85)

The time-based psycho-bombs are fissions of utter empathetic lack, ruptures of detached psychologies. Because our fleshy, sensitive corpus is over stimulated, temporeally and attentively impoverished the result is psychopathy, an intensely suffering psyche that is treated with a slew of Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors or stimulants such as Ritalin that address attentive illness. But this epidemic of medication is not the only story. My suggestion here is that there are two types of psychopath, a suffering Berardian psychopath, and a more clinical and culturally stigmatized ‘psychopath’ – a psychopath that must be understood from the British and American usage of the term. Thus, there is the Berardian psychopathology of the suffering - an etymologically literal concept, a suffering psyche -  and also the psychopath of the few who happen, through a fluke of neurological, genetic and environmental conditions, to be best suited to the environment of stimuli excess. It is this latter type of psychopath, the psychopath I am most interested in, that are almost immune or best conditioned to cope and thrive within the cognitive and attentive climate that Berardi so wonderfully illustrates as a crucial mechanism of late capitalism.

This distinction needs to be approached with care, there are many subtle similarities and that ought to be taken into account. I state this now because, as I shall shortly show, the suffering Berardian Psychopathy, and the more traditional psychopathy that in clinical terms shows lack of reaction to aural, visual and tactile stimuli (and in cultural terms is associated with violence, dominance and crime), are in a sense poles of manifestation of the same condition.

To appreciate this we may take a moment, a short detour, to think about a general working trend, that anyone who has worked in Sales or Customer Service will be familiar with. Let us picture a scenario, a call center for examples sake. Each day millions and millions of calls flood into a call center. The call center’s job is customer service, the company has not provided good service to its many customers which are now complaining. The predicament for the workers inside the call center is that the company will not allow full refunds, replacements or likewise. The company has accepted it simply cannot fulfill the service level promised by them and expected by the customers. Hence, the large busy call center. A large part of the job is looking at photos of injuries that customers may have experienced as a result of the failed products and services as well as listening to the customers’ grievances on the phone. One worker is a high level psychopath - let’s call her Sue. Sue takes her breaks mid call, cares little for the customers whose lives are ruined and refuses to help her co-workers or participate in any activities that involve social niceties. Alongside the Sue is Jane. Jane is not a psychopath, in fact she cares a great deal about the customers and her co-workers. Sue’s managers like her, she performs, according to the quantifiable criteria they have access to, very very well. She is consistent, efficient and highly productive – she takes more calls than many of her fellow workers. Jane, is not, according to her managers and the quantifiable evidence they have access to performing so well. Jane spends far too long listening, sometimes spending a whole afternoon trying to help or console one customer. The crux of the matter is that Jane cares too much to be as efficient. Janes focuses all her energy on one customer at a time, and empathizes greatly with the distraught customer’s she deals with. Sue does not empathise with her customers, she says what is needed to give enough of an impression of care and sympathy only so she can move on to the next call. For Sue, each call is a number, a task to complete with as little effort and in as quicker time as possible – the polar opposite of Jane. Sue is never tired at the end of each day, unlike Jane, who leaves the call center exhausted and often in a flood of tears. After months of this the managers have a meeting, they know Jane cares about her job and want to help her. The managers see in the reports that Sue performs best and so approach her to coach Jane. Sue refuses, explaining she will only do so for additional pay. The managers cannot pay Sue more, so instead they listen to her calls and build a script from they way she conducts her conversation with many upset customers. The managers notice how she ‘directs the call’, ‘controls the conversation’, ‘builds rapport’ and ‘manages the customers expectations’. Some weeks later the managers provide Jane with an intensive training course modeled on Sue’s recorded phonecalls. Essentially, Jane is given a script, she was supposed to follow the script as best she could, saying this or that at each junction to provide a satisfactory resolution for the customer. Jane explains that she doesn’t want to sound like a robot, that the customers need to be listened to and given respect and care because the product/service has failed so badly – at this the managers explain that as long as she follows the script the customers will feel respected and cared for. Jane grudgingly agrees to try the new way of working. After many months Jane is following the script flawlessly, she is almost talking automatically, she gets through so many calls with so much ease that she begins playing minesweeper and online scrabble on her computer to prevent herself from getting bored. At this stage Jane does not really listen to the tearful or angry words on the customers end of the line, she has stopped caring because she feels safe in the knowledge that as long as she follows the script she will give a polite, professional and sympathetic impression to the customer – a better impression than she ever could previously and with less emotional effort. This is the modus operandi of sales or customer service management; to put in place semi-automatic strategies that give an impression of care, empathy, enthusiasm, fun, excitement etc.

The little detour, the tale of Sue and Jane, shows the two poles of psychopathy. One is present from the start this could be because of frontal lobe trauma, it could be genetic, we may never know why Sue is like she is. Jane, however, is very low on the psychopathy spectrum, she cares deeply for everyone she comes into contact with; she is upset by the photos customers send in documenting their misfortune and she gets upset when customers cry, shout or swear on the phone. What is key here is that, due to the managers’ reports only showing quantifiable results Jane appears to be a poorly performing worker and Sue appears to be a highly effective worker. Because of this Jane is asked to behave and conduct her work life like her psychopathic co-worker Sue. So she can perform better, so her managers can effectively and quantifiably get more labour and results from Jane, she is trained into behaving as a psychopath. But this is not bad for Jane. By caring less Jane is upset less. After her training Jane never left the call center in tears. In a sense, Jane learnt how to become psychopathic so she could exist more comfortably in such a stimuli intensive and pressurized work environment.

Thus, the tale of Sue and Jane, shows a few things. That psychopathy is advantageous in high pressure and competitive work environments (this is not a new notion, there are a slew of films that concern themselves with the intersection of Capitalism and Psychopathy). The tale also elucidates how empathy is not productive in the quantifiable registers of many management methods concerned with productivity, volumes, efficiencies etc. Most, importantly, it shows how the Berardian suffering psyche, the Berardian psychopath must adapt to behave and feel like a psychopath proper in order to perform better and with less personal distress to themselves under conditions of high stimuli and pressure.  

However, the tale of Sue and Jane doesn’t tell the whole story. There is another side of the story that shows how psychopathy is a parasitic strategy dependent on the empathy of others. This other aspect of the tale illustrates how such psychopathic parasitism is a cultivation of capitalism, but that it is not a solution (as per Ayn Rand’s Capitalist Objectivism) but a symptom manifested by a change only a proportion of people can undergo. If we were all psychopaths capitalism would not work.

Here is why. Sue and post-training Jane ‘solve all their calls’. The customers then fill in surveys rating their experience. The questions are simplistic and closed: ‘Was your grievance addressed?’ or ‘Did the agent explain what they were going to do?’ or ‘Was the call answered quickly and politely?’ are the types of questions the customers answer. Almost all customers who fill in the survey respond positively to each closed question. But in actuality Sue and Jane did nothing to rectify the customers’ poor experience. Sue and Jane always answered quickly and politely. They always explained what they were going to do, but mostly as a control strategy to direct the conversation. Most tellingly, Sue and Jane often addressed the customers’ grievances by explaining that the service and product was poor - they would then apologize for this but then explain that nothing can be done because the resources of compensation or repair were limited and needed to be used on the most severe cases. Naturally most customers, after some cajoling, excepted that Sue and Jane could not help them and left feeling bad. Some customers felt bad because they suspected that Sue and Jane did not care. Some customers felt pushed into accepting poor treatment. And some customers felt that Sue or Jane did care but were helpless and useless. Despite all of this the customers could answer the closed questions with begrudgingly positive responses. This side of the story illustrates how Sue and Jane, in their psychopathic methods, preyed on and took advantage of the empathetic capacities of their customers.

But what of the most severe cases that did deserve some recompense or reparation? A quick examination of this minor aspect shows the parasitism inherent in psychopathic behaviors generated via capitals mans stimuli intensive environments. The company did have some resources for such incidents but these resources were not enough. The company was, via market forces, a monopoly that provided the worst service but at a price that was too high. The shareholders were always pleased. When a customer with very severe failure came through to Sue or Jane they offered the resources they could, but they didn’t have enough for all the very severe failures so they approached other co-workers. Sue and Jane explained to their co-workers that they had an unimaginably severe failure to deal with, and that, even though resources were stretched, their customer needed the recompense most. Sue and Jane bent the truth a little and exaggerated in order to get back on the phone and ‘solve another call’. Sue and Jane soon turned their control, manipulation and reasoning skills on their co-workers, they essentially exploited the empathy of their co-workers – Sue and Jane were psychopathically methodological empathy parasites. However, one day, a top performer from another office, Jed, moved to their branch. Jed was just as efficient and effective in ‘solving calls’ as Sue and Jane. One day Sue had the worst case she had ever experienced, she wasn’t emotional or distressed by the case but knew that the customer had the worst and most catastrophic failure she had come across. Sue approached Jed, and explained this. Jed said he didn’t care, that it was her problem to deal with. Sue explained the policy of resources being directed to the most severe cases; Jed explained that all his cases were worse than the one Sue was dealing with and told he to leave him alone to work.

The above illustrates how parasitic psychopathic working requires low level or non-psychopathic hosts. It also shows how capitalist psychopathic parasitism is contingent on the present and exploitable empathy resource of others. Thus, if we were all psychopaths, capitalism would fail, but at the same time, capitalism, technology and intensive stimuli environments are forcing people into operating psychopathically and parasitically. In a sense, capitalism creates parasitic psychopathic operandi but it cannot continue to do so.

Thus, the difference between the Berardian psychopath, the suffering psyche of over stimulation, and psychopath proper is that one is a pathway to the other. Or, to phrase it another way, the method of alleviating the suffering of the former is to become the latter. But this is not a cure for all, it is contingent on the suffering and exploitation of others. This passage is the capitalist passage, a flux that is not a solution but temporary change and temporary solution. This close examination of the interation between psychopathy and parasitism under late capitalism is an attempt to illuminate the forces and modes of capitalism. I suggest the dynamics explored here detail important biologically and psychologically grounded vectors of a capitalism that is inevitably doomed and nihilistic in its operation, function and implementation.


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[2] See‎ (last accessed 26/12/2013)
[3] See (last accessed 26/12/2013)

Vio(len)ce Part 5: The Voice of Objection

The Voice of Objection.

To begin understanding the psychological implications of the violence and trauma of acquiring voice it is necessary to relate each physiological change in the infant to their subjectivity. I state this for two reasons. Firstly, the genesis of voice ought to be framed in relation to contingent psychological implications. Secondly I propose that to render the centrality of voice to contemporary control regimes, to understand why voice maintains itself as a locus of violence, an appreciation of the journey of wedding voice to subjectivity must be garnered.

It is crucial to begin at the precise emergence of voice. The pause after the distress cry, the moment when the infant learns of the presence of the caregiver and enters into socially formatted turn taking, is crucial. As previously detailed, this is the emergence of voice. As soon as the reflexive distress cry is re-formatted as socialized, intentional turn taking and calling the animalistic cry becomes voice. Appreciation of such an instances harmony with the Aristotlean definition of voice (as “a kind of sound with meaning, and not, like a cough, just of the in breathed air” (Aristotle, 1986, p.179)) is the platform from where a question of subjectivity emerges. The infant must, on some level, have a concept of it being a subject; a subject surrounded by objects that provide care and nourishment and alleviate distress. The turn taking, the call, the intent for the call and the wait, the listening all point towards subjectivity. On closer scrutiny the moment when a cry becomes a subject’s call, becomes a voice, is defined by silence, listening and absence. The silent wait that follows a brief distress cry marks the cry as a call from a being of awareness and subjectivity. It is at this juncture where the biological necessity becoming curiosity, the cry becoming voice, the animalistic sound becoming a human subjects calling, folds back into the psychoanalytic.

The Lacanian concept of the inaudible object voice is key here. Dolar states how:

“As soon as the object, both as gaze and as voice, appears at the pivotal point of narcissistic self-apprehension, it introduces a rupture at the core of self presence. It is something that cannot itself be present, although the whole notion of presence is constructed around it and can only be established only by its elision. So the subject, far from being constituted by self apprehension in the clarity of its presence to itself, emerges only in the impossible relation to that bit which cannot be present. (…) The voice may well be the key to the presence of the present and to an unalloyed interiority, but it conceals in its bosom that inaudible object voice which disrupts both.” (Dolar, 2006, p.42).

This passage illustrates the subject in relation to the object voice. The subject emerges bathed in the glow of an absence – this is the moment of ceasing to cry and commencing the silent act of listening that constitutes the cry as becoming voice. The self apprehension required for a coming subjectivity does not occur during the cry, but precisely when the silence of listening ruptures the sonic affect, the cry. Likewise, the unalloyed interiority of the crying being and its present presence are utterly defined and dependent upon the rupture brought upon by the object voice, the wait and deafening silence of listening. Auto-affection, the genesis of subjectivity, happens in the silence of the object voice in conjunction with listening and waiting. This follows Derrida’s concept of auto-affection; precisely in how thinking oneself is immediately a differ-encing action of thinking oneself through the other: “hark… is care coming to me?” In Derridean terms this is auto-affection as always already hetero-affection. In Lacanian terms it is a rupture that refers to a void. It is precisely this void (to reconcile Derridean concepts with Lacanian concepts I suggest the void between auto-affection and hetero-affection) where the pause of the newborns cry, creates voice(s) by bi-poiesis, reteroactively imbuing the cry with intent and turning it into voice and also flooding the silence of listening with the “inaudible and unbearable object voice” (Dolar, 1996, p.16). It is in this sense that the silent waiting and listening of the infant is the premier performative act par excellence of how the object voice “embodies the very impossibility of attaining auto-affection; it introduces a scission, a rupture in the middle of full presence, and refers it to a void- but a void which is not simply a lack, an empty space; it is a void in which the voice comes to resonate.” (Dolar, 2006, p.42, my emphasis).

Thus, just as Derrida states that “the “voice of being” (..) is silent, mute, insonorous, wordless, originarily a-phonic” (Derrida, 1998, p.22) and as Zizek states how “the object voice par excellence, of course, is silence. (…) and what effectively reverberates is the void: resonance always takes place in a vacuum” the consistency across both thinkers conceptions of subjectivity in relation to voice is precisely the silence of subjectivity, the object voice echoing in the void between auto and hetero-affection.

 The pause of the infant that signals both the seed of subjectivity and the coming of voice is violence, because this is the first of many instances of socialization and subjectivity ordering the reflexive impulses of the body, to cease the sound of distress requires strength, control and discipline – as any one who has caught their shin in a hushed cinema will attest to. The infant’s pause is a violent act of socializing and subject forming, but unlike potty training, the educational system and later modes of control and conformity it is a locus of self-flagellation. The simultaneous coming of voice and subjectivity is the first act of self-discipline. After the auto-violence of voice and subjectivity come further acts, tracking analogously with the fall of the larynx. The learning of language, the breaking of the voice in puberty etc all follow from a precedent set by the trauma of the infantile object voice. It is from this basis, of voice as a locus and genesis of violence and marks of trauma, that I wish to approach the contemporary context of voice in relation to technology and late capitalism.

Spectrogram of an infant's cry.


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Aristotle. 1986. De Anima (On The Soul). Penguin. London.

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Vio(len)ce Part 4: The Object Voice of the Subject Cry

The Object Voice of the Subject Cry

I would like to consider the timing of the laryngeal descent in infants in relation to developmental and psychoanalytic understandings of subjectivity. To appreciate the later application of the violence of voice/voi(len)ce an understanding of the developmental and psychoanalytical origins must be explored. The implications of when and how the larynx descends in the infant must be scrutinized closely.

To begin I will outline what happens before the larynx descends. Making a sound is not a taught or learnt affect. Making a sound happens automatically for newborns. Making sounds for this or that (voice), using it for communicative purposes (be it to signal distress or request nourishment) is another matter.  To be clear, the initial making of a sound is instinctive and reflexive. In fact, making a sound, like hearing, resides in the pre-occularcentric intra-uterine realm. Even before birth “(t)he human foetus may be practicing the use of its voice already in utero.” (Karpf, 2007, p.95) Just such a phenomena is vagitus uterinus. For example, “(i)n 1923, an American physician, George Ryder, heard the sound of a baby crying after he had applied traction with forceps. Listening via stethoscope, his assistant and nurses said the sounds were ‘high and squealing, much like the sound of a kitten’.”(Karpf, 2007, p.94-95) The first cry is not voice; it is merely a necessary physical reflex. The purpose of the first cry is to clear the airways of mucus so the first breath can be taken. Akin to a hiccup, there is no intentional affect in the first cry; it’s just a physical necessity that happens to make a sound.

However, shortly after such a coincidentally sonic physical action is embarked upon a voice begins to be born. Subsequent cries yield nourishment, comfort and care. But just because the cry yields nourishment, comfort or care does not mean the cry asks for these things. Infant cries do not change for hunger or pain; initially the cry is analogous to distress. Many things may cause distress but the causes of distress do not illicit different types of cry. Such simplicity of the infants distress cry does not detract from its crucial validity with regard to the genesis of cultivating a voice because at each cry of distress an interaction follows. Simply by the connection of a sonic reflexive reaction to distress yielding the care that is required to survive a voice is born:

“Newborns’ cries are desperate because they haven’t yet realized that they’ll produce a response. But already, six to eight weeks later, they sometimes go quiet after a bout of crying, to listen for their parent’s footsteps. If they don’t hear them, they then resume crying. The cry is no longer simply a reflex – now it’s begun to be one side of a conversation. Within a couple of months of being born, babies leave a space for a response to their cry: they’ve learned the art of turn taking.” (Karpf, 2007, p.99)

Thus, in the very transition from reflexive cries of distress to signalling distress cries embedded within a turn taking matrix an important shift happens; an animalistic cry turns to voice. The new cry has an expectation, indeed it is a call, not merely a sonic emission of the body; but an intent, a meaningful cry: a voice. It is precisely at this juncture where the Aristotlean distinction between voice and mere animalistic sound resonates. Aristotle states how “it is not every sound of an animal that is voice (…) as voice is a kind of sound with meaning, and not, like a cough, just of the in breathed air”. (Aristotle, 1986, p.179) As soon as the reflexive distress cry changes into a signalling, turn taking call it takes on meaning, intent and soul. It is this transition that is the birth of voice. It is a birth that transforms a natural instinct into a social and communicative tool. But this is just the beginning of the violence of voice that leads to an ongoing re-enactment of the evolutionary trauma.

Recall the evolutionary descent of the larynx, and how such a change is mirrored, in a microcosm, in the change from newborn laryngeal form to dropped adult laryngeal form. After the newborn’s transition from animalistic distress cry to turn taking signalling the laryngeal changes track analogously to the acquisition of language. A “child’s growing mastery of the sounds of speech is partly the result of the gradual descent of its larynx and the root of its tongue during the first two to six years of its life.” (Karpf, 2007, p.53) Think of young family members, hearing and attempting to say words and phrases of increasing complexity. Oftentimes they may sound like their tongue is clumsy and not under their full control. Yellow becomes a frustrating single word tongue twister; it may be pronounced as “lellulow” or “yayolo” for instance. This is because the infants tongue and larynx are still descending into positions that would afford the tongue the space for the serpent-like dexterity required to master the whole of their native language. Such a co-ordination of vocalization skills continues to mirror the evolutionary emergence of voice and language. Babies cannot speak on all fours, but by the time they are teetering around under out of reach vases and ornaments their larynxes are dropping and they begin gaining speech. The larynx continues dropping till the end of puberty, just like our ancestors who slowly stood upright to full height, our larynx doesn’t not reach the final place, conducive to speech and choking, until we reach our full height and have struggled though years of subject forming experiences. In gaining our adult voice we re-enact the evolutionary trauma of changing from mammal to walking and talking adult human.